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Agency theory meets matching theory
Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-33
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular, matching theory can be a tool …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496097
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Delegated portfolio management: a survey of the theoretical literature
Stracca, Livio - 2005
of portfolio managers, the role of reputational concerns in a multiperiod framework, and the incentives to noise trading …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604566
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You Don't Always Get What You Pay For
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422168
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You don't always get what you pay for
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396
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Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment
Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - 2005
Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369211
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The marketability of bank assets and managerial rents: implications for financial stability
Fecht, Falko; Wagner, Wolf - 2007
adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers' rents, reducing their incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295931
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113
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Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?
Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - 2002
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261264
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Delegation and incentives
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2006
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a …. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We nd that the … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299113