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Design of incentives in community based health insurance schemes

Ahuja, Rajeev; Jütting, Johannes - 2003

be circumvented through group insurance contract; and (iii) how to set incentives for scheme managers. Various public … policies are discussed that help to set appropriate incentives to better manage health insurance schemes in low-income country …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323582

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599569

Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard

Houben, Eike - 2002

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282329

Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and its Application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307350

Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335456

Efficient promotion of renewable energy with reverse auctions

Schäfer, Sebastian; Schulten, Lisa - 2015

auctions. We analyze incentives for bidders to manipulate the auction outcome and adapt the design to prevent this behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335496

Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad - 2014

We study how seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior on eBay are affected by an improvement in market transparency. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441861

When trust fades...: Can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

design I prove in the paper, that government - as principal - is only capable of applying perverse incentives towards the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010327715

Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad O. - 2013

We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328733

Managerial turnover in a changing world

Pavan, Alessandro; Garrett, Daniel - 2010

We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332108