Tradable Permits – a Market-Based Allocation System for the Environment. Tradable Permits and Other Environmental Policy Instruments – Killing one Bird with two Stones. Tradable Permits – Ten Key Design Issues. Tradable Permits with Imperfect Monitoring. Emissions Trading with Greenhouse...

We study the environmental and economic effects of public abatement in the presence of multiple stable steady-state ecological equilibria. Under shallow-lake dynamics (SLD), the isocline for the stock of pollution features two stable branches, a good and a bad one. Assuming that the ecology is...

This book provides novel and in-depth perspectives on evaluating environment and sustainability issues in developing countries. Evaluating Environment in International Development focuses on the approaches and experiences of leading international organizations, not-for-profits, and multilateral...

This paper studies Krugman's (1991) core-periphery model and extends it to include environmental pollution. We present the first analytic proof that only an even spreading of the firms over both of the two regions or a complete agglomeration of all manufacturing firms in one region are possible...

In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full co-operation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all...

In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal...

In this article I survey the theoretical literature on environmental policy in the presence of imperfect competition, ranging from early contributions in the 1960s to the present. I cover the following market structures when polluting firms have market power in the output market: monopoly,...

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adopt new technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms which are subject to regulation. We...

We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the...