Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...

Under collusion, firms deviate from current profit maximization in anticipation of future rewards. As current profit maximization places little restrictions on firms' pricing behaviour, collusive conduct is hard to infer. We show that bids from certain firms in the Colombian wholesale...

Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority's resource...

Der Telekommunikationssektor ist diejenige Netzindustrie, die innerhalb der Europäischen Union dem wohl ambitioniertesten Reformprozeß unterworfen wurde. Deregulierung und Privatisierung sind die wesentlichen Bausteine, von denen dauerhaft niedrigere Preisniveaus, beschleunigter technischer...

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a...

The outburst of the 2008 global economic crisis sparked a myriad of criticism on mainstream neoclassical economic theory, held responsible for not even have considered the possibility of the kind of collapse that the subprime mortgage meltdown unleashed. In this paper, it is argued that what...