The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur,...

This note reports part of a larger study of petty corruption by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of...

The paper is a review of results on the asymptotic behavior of Markov processes generated by i.i.d. iterates of monotone maps. Of particular importance is the notion of splitting introduced by Dubins and Freedman (1966). Some extensions to more general frameworks are outlined, and, finally, a...

This paper analyzes Influence Peddling with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of...

In this paper we prove the existence,uniqueness and stability of the invariant distribution of a random dynamical system in which the admissible family of laws of motion consists of monotone maps from a closed subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space into itself.

We use a model of real-time decentralized information processing to understand how constraints on human information processing affect the returns to scale of organizations. We identify three informational (dis)economies of scale: diversification of heterogeneous risks (positive), sharing of...