For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...

Basel II changes risk management in banks strongly. Internal rating procedures would lead one to expect that banks are changing over to active risk control. But, if risk management is no longer a simple "game against nature", if all agents involved are active players then a shift from a...

Helping somebody may undermine his incentives to work. What Buchanan identified more than 25 years ago as the Samaritan's dilemma is basically a time-inconsistency problem. The paper discusses possible solutions of the dilemma such as punishment within an iterated game, reshaping the game in the...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot?oligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on introducing the product and competition on the product market. Product innovation is assumed to increase consumer utility but is effective only if the innovating firm invests in marketing, so that...

The ways of decision making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: the rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by...

Der vorliegende Diskussionsbeitrag entstand im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojektes über die monetäre Integration von fünf mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Beitrittskandidaten (Polen, Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Slowenien und Estland). Das hier vorgestellte Kapitel geht auf die...

The mainstream model of option pricing is based on an exogenously given process of price movements. The implication of this assumption is that price movements are not affected by actions of market participants. However, if we assume that there are indeed impacts on the price movements it no...

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and...

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

This paper investigates strategic interactions between a private highway operator anda private transit operator who uses the same highway for its services. Heterogeneity oftravellers is taken into account by considering a continuous distribution of values of time.Demand elasticity arises from...