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Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence
Berggren, Niclas; Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof; Hellström, Jörgen - 2012
credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320270
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Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis
Grüner, Hans Peter - 1994
Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397973
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The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements - Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s
Belke, Ansgar; Freytag, Andreas; Keil, Jonas; … - 2012
Monetary policy rules have been considered as fundamental protection against inflation. However, empirical evidence for a correlation between rules and inflation is relatively weak. In this paper, we first discuss likely causes for this weak link and present the argument that monetary commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334520
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Does monetary policy credibility help in anchoring inflation expectations? Evidence from six inflation targeting emerging economies
Güler, Aslı - In: Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 10 (2021) 1, pp. 93-111
extent to which inflation expectations are formed by the announced targets. As the credibility of the central bank increases … target. Credibility enables expectation to be formed in a forward-looking way by weakening its connection with the past. This … study aims to contribute to the literature concerning the effects of credibility on monetary policy. For this purpose, using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014558525
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States, Banks and the Financing of the Economy: Monetary Policy and Regulatory Perspectives
Balling, Morten; Jackson, Patricia; Gnan, Ernest; … - 2013
On 5-6 September 2012 SUERF held its 30th Colloquium “States, Banks, and the Financing of the Economy” at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the Colloquium. All the papers in this publication discuss from different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689959
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Forecasting the central bank’s inflation objective is a good rule of thumb
Diron, Marie; Mojon, Benoît - 2005
This paper first shows that the forecast error incurred when assuming that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target announced by the central bank is typically at least as small and often smaller than forecast errors of model-based and published inflation forecasts. It then shows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604610
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Central Bank Conservatism and Labor Market Reform
Jordahl, Henrik; Laséen, Stefan - 1999
How does central bank conservatism affect labor market reform? In this paper we examine the economic forces at work. An increase in conservatism triggers two opposite effects. It reduces the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy and hence the benefits of a reform. It also increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321824
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Measuring effective monetary policy conservatism
Berlemann, Michael; Hielscher, Kai - 2009
According to the game-theoretic model of monetary policy, inflation is the consequence of time-inconsistent behavior of the monetary authority. The inflation bias can be eased by handing over the responsibility for monetary policy to an independent central bank and appointing a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270388
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Inflation targeting, credibility and non-linear Taylor rules
Neuenkirch, Matthias; Tillmann, Peter - 2012
-)establish credibility, optimal monetary policy under discretion is shown to set higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded … term in the central bank's optimal instrument rule, which we refer to as the credibility loss. Augmenting a standard Taylor … seven central banks and that this influence is economically meaningful. A deteroriation in credibility forces central …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294449
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On the Credibility of Currency Boards
Feuerstein, Switgard; Grimm, Oliver - 2004
The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296385