In this paper the financial means of international (mostly Islamistic) terror organizations are analysed. First, some short remarks about the organization of international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is provided about the financing of...

We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that...

In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get...

The impact of organized crime on inter-regional price disparities in Russia is estimated for each year from 1992 to 2000, and over the panel of 1993-2000, using a sample of 70 Russian regions, and that of 50 regions from the European part of the country. The relationship between prices and crime...

Die Finanzströme von organisierter Kriminalität und Terrorismus sind in dieser Arbeit dargestellt. Zunächst wird ein Versuch unternommen, den Umsatz der organisierten Kriminalität in 20 OECD-Ländern zu schätzen. Das Ausmaß an finanziellen kriminellen Aktivitäten (Umsätzen) dieser 20...

Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...

We consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply?...

Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more fields of law enforcement, though their deterrence effects are often hard to observe, and the likely effect of changes in the specific features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper...

When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire...