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Blonski, Matthias; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2001

We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281240

On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation

Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger - 2003

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how "much" cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325070

Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations

Heiner, Ronald Asher; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 1995

The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296941

Facing a dilemma: Cooperative behavior and beauty

Darai, Donja; Grätz, Silvia - 2012

This paper investigates the influence of physical attractiveness on cooperative behavior. We survey data from 211 episodes of a television game show and combine it with independent facial attractiveness ratings of the show's contestants. The final of the show represents a simultaneous one-shot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316835

Finite memory distributed systems

Dorofeenko, Viktor; Shorish, Jamsheed - 2006

A distributed system model is studied, where individual agents play repeatedly against each other and change their strategies based upon previous play. It is shown how to model this environment in terms of continuous population densities of agent types. A complication arises because the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293707

The importance of knowing your own reputation

Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian - 2012

control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information … relative to the control treatments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294404

Partnerships, imperfect monitoring and outside options: Theory and experimental evidence

Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia; Riener, Gerhard - 2012

We study theoretically and experimentally a two-person partnership game whereby agents only see the uncertain outcome of their joint effort but not how much the other agent contributed to it. The model combines problems of free-riding present in public good production and in teams with imperfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291842

In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting

van Veelen, Matthijs; Garcia, Julian - 2010

Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326023

In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs

van Veelen, Matthijs; Garcia, Julian - 2012

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326522

Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma: An experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011

dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even … foster cooperation. If we combine both qualifications and do not control for beliefs, we only find an uncertainty effect. If … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843

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