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Corruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economy
Bennett, John; Estrin, Saul - 2006
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267880
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Corruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economy
Bennett, John; Estrin, Saul - 2006
In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011470762
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Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majumdar, Mukul; Radner, Roy - 2008
The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292052
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The economics of repeated extortion
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003
This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We show that the inability of government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305453
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Auctions vs. negotiations: The case of favoritism
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291548
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Green Lemons - Environmental Labels and Entry into an Environmentally Differentiated Market under Asymmetric Information
Kuhn, Michael - 1999
The paper inquires whether a public eco-label mitigatesadverse selection, where an ecologically superior (green) product variant is underprovided. A model, integrating entry into a perfectly competitive, vertically differentiated industry and rationally expected quality structure (REQS) under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319327
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One size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats
Lessmann, Christian; Markwardt, Gunther - 2008
The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially … data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300599
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One size fits all? : decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats
Lessmann, Christian; Markwardt, Gunther - 2009
The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially …-country data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275803
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Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
Balafoutas, Loukas - 2009
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as … the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the …, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294786
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The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control
Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - 2012
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283593