Die Qualität von Lebensmitteln - insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Güte der Inhaltsstoffe und die Herstellungsart - ist von Verbrauchern nur schwer überprüfbar. Um die Glaubwürdigkeit von Qualitätsversprechen zu erhöhen und die Unsicherheit in der Beziehung zwischen Herstellern und...

If buyers do not observe the quality of a product and production of quality is costly, market allocations can be very inefficient. Certification intermediaries are institutions that provide information about quality to buyers. The amount of information in the market determines the incentives...

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

Despite growing interest in meat traceability systems, very little research has been done on consumer needs and perception of traceability. This gap is partly filled by the present study of consumer perception of meat traceability in Belgium, based on cross-sectional data collected in June 2001....

The last couple of decades have seen an increased retail concentration around the world, particularly in Europe. Views on the welfare implications of this severe change are controversial. Consumers might benefit because larger stores (owned by larger retailer chains) offer more product choices....

This paper focuses on ignored issues regarding the impact of trade reforms in transition economies. These economies are primarily characterized by a low quality of their products, large depreciations of their currencies, and a high degree of government intervention in economic activity. These...

Anti-dumping actions are now the trade policy of choice of developing and transition economies. To understand why these economies have increasingly applied anti-dumping laws, we build a simple theoretical model of vertical intra-industry trade and investigate the strategic incentives of...

We examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two differentcountries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficientin terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger andendowed with a...

In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...