Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 12,976
Cover Image
The price of media capture and the looting of newspapers in interwar France
Bignon, Vincent; Flandreau, Marc - 2012
This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316814
Cover Image
Corruption within a cooperative society
Kosfeld, Michael - 1997
In this paper we take up a model of Okada (1996) to describe the possibility of collective cooperation in a n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game by means of institutional arrangements. In addition, we introduce the possibility to corrupt the institutional authority by paying him some positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291754
Cover Image
Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane; Majumdar, Mukul; Radner, Roy - 2008
The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292052
Cover Image
Corruption and Political Competition
Damania, Richard; Yalcýn, Erkan - 2008
There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of … groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political … corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010295264
Cover Image
Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency
Lambsdorff, Johann; Nell, Mathias - 2007
Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300175
Cover Image
Corruption and the shadow economy
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305428
Cover Image
The economics of repeated extortion
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003
This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We show that the inability of government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305453
Cover Image
Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.; Nijkamp, Peter - 2004
queuing theory to firstdemonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular groupof …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325471
Cover Image
On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption
Hauk, Esther; Sáez-Martí, María - 2001
We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model … corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on … interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334670
Cover Image
Optimal leniency programs
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608606