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Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008
antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325912
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to … collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326004
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How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration is Possible
Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - 2002
Regulating seaports is difficult in general, even more so for the weak regulatory institutions common in developing countries. For this reason some countries have awarded these facilities via Demsetz auctions, to the port operator that bids the lowest cargo-handling fee. A major concern with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369132
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Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
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Virtual capacity and competition
Schultz, Christian - 2005
In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261290
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Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence
Normann, Hans-Theo - 2010
The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302573
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Ein Modell der Netzwerkeffekte in der Software-Industrie
Gröhn, Andreas - 1997
Computerbesitzer kombinieren Komplementärguter zu einem Computersystem. Mit dem Computersystem möchten sie Daten mit anderen Nachfragern und zwischen verschiedenen Applikationen austauschen. Aus diesen Interdependenzen ergeben sich drei verschiedene Netzwerkeffekte, die im Rahmen eines...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275114
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Fighting hard core cartels
Hüschelrath, Kai; Weigand, Jürgen - 2010
attention to cartel detection methods, the derivation of corporate fines, the quantification of private damages and … possibilities to judge on the successfulness of cartel enforcement activities by competition authorities around the world. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303008
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Illinois Walls
Schinkel, Maarten Pieter; Tuinstra, Jan; Rüggeberg, Jakob - 2005
collusion. It allows an upstream cartel to shield itself from private damage claims by forwarding a share of cartel profits to … private damages. The cartel can achieve this by rationing inputs at low prices. Several U.S. antitrust cases show symptoms of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325452
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Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases
Friederiszick, Hans W.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik - 2010
court cases - the paper wholesaler cartel decision of 2007 and the cement cartel decision of 2009. We characterise the trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352103