Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 13,981
Cover Image
Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation
Sturm, Bodo; Riechmann, Thomas; Dannenberg, Astrid; … - 2007
We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297936
Cover Image
Effects of profitable downsizing on collective bargaining
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Köhler, Christoph - 2008
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263854
Cover Image
Reciprocity and emotions : arousal, self-reports, and expectations
Ben-Shakhar, Gershon; Bornstein, Gary; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - 2004
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261278
Cover Image
Learning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavior
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; … - 2010
players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286460
Cover Image
North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
Caparrós, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - 2003
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325037
Cover Image
A value for cephoidal NTU-games
Rosenmüller, Joachim - 2007
A cephoid is an algebraic ('Minkowski') sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272611
Cover Image
Moral sentiments and social choice: Fairness considerations in university admissions
Karni, Edi; Safra, Zvi - 2003
viewpoint that social justice reflects the moral attitudes of the constituent members, we analyze the effect of the intensity of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293452
Cover Image
Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity
Lange, Andreas; Vogt, Carsten - 2001
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297749
Cover Image
Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation
Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2005
The Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In the present paper we therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261328
Cover Image
Gerechtigkeit in Gesundheitssystemen aus ökonomischer Perspektive
Schreyögg, Jonas - 2003
implicitly assume that countries have a universal understanding of justice. But this assumption is rather questionable. With … regard to the existing cultural differences in the understanding of justice the transferability of elements of health care … systems is not always given. A transfer usually requires a thorough examination of the ideas of justice in each country. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300530