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The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324705
The EU agenda for improving competitiveness is missing in action. Economic competitiveness has been a central plank in the development of the European Union - a relentless quest for policies that lead to more prosperity and that make European companies in world markets more successful. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014560176
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263309
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272937
This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272558
The importance of auction theory has gained increased recognition in the scientific community, the latest recognition … being the award of the Nobel price to Vickrey and Mirrlees. Auction theory has been used in quite different fields, both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291059
We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325053
game of duopolistic R&D competition. By comparing open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, representing imperfect and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435516
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261198
have to compete for jobs. Our aim is to investigate how this competition affects the investment decisions of firms. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261761