This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that -...

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example,...

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference,...

The „first track“ of Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol gives host and investor countries total freedom in choosing a baseline for a project reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases. This is due to the fact that an overly generous granting of emission credits leads to a...

The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that industrialised countries and countries with economies in transition, i.e. the group of Annex I countries, shall reduce their overall emissions of carbon dioxide and other five greenhouse gases by at least 5 % as compared to their 1990 emission levels. This...

In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs and a backstop technology ('air capture') with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on situations in which countries...

Global public good provision (e.g. environmental quality) confronts us with problems demanding both national and international co-operation. However among sovereign nations reaching agreement on mutual public good provision is difficult. Slowing down global warming is just one example. Due to...