We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information … can be withdrawn after observation of competitors' contract offers. We show that an equilibrium always exists where … consumers obtain their respective Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) contract. Jointly profit-making contracts can also be sustained …

Expected utility theory holds that the demand for insurance is a demand for certainty, because under the conventional … specification of the theory, it appears as if buyers of insurance prefer certain losses to actuarially equivalent uncertain ones … paper attempts to reconcile expected utility theory with this empirical evidence by suggesting that insurance is demanded to …

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast … uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance …

We discuss the prevalence of pooling equilibria in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric …-risk consumers are profitably detracted from the candidate pooling contract. …

Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast … uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance …

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled … corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers? net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyer …?s risk, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers …

Individual moral hazard engendered by health insurance and monopolistic production are both typical phenomena of drug … insurance against the risk of drug expenses. In contrast, the social welfare criterion suggests that individuals should purchase … more insurance coverage than they choose to do in the market equilibrium. …

which patient consumers use high effort and buy a profit-making insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient …We analyse a 2-period competitive insurance market which is characterized by the simultaneous presence of standard … consumers use low effort and buy a contract with low coverage or even remain uninsured. This finding may help to explain why …