This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal...

This paper develops a model of tax enforcement in which the tax agency is allowed to make pre-audit settlement offers to taxpayers. Settlements can either take the form of public amnesties or individual plea bargains. In this model, pre-audit settlements allow the agency to overcome its limited...

This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which the indicted and the enforcer can negotiate the level of the penalty by means of a settlement. The emphasis of the analysis is on the credibility of the settlement other: the enforcer cannot threaten an incredibly large conviction rate if...

This paper extends the literature on tax amnesties by consid-ering two special grace programmes. The first is an offer by the government not to investigate taxpayers' accounts, the second not to prosecute indicted evaders. I analyse the impact of both measures on the taxpayers' optimal behaviour...

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior....

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certification markets. Firms that intend to engage in a regulated activity must produce third-party certification of compliance with prescribed regulations and standards. The certification service is provided by independent...

The paper investigates the optimal scope of trade secrets law. In the model, one innovative firm invests resources first to produce knowledge, and then to protect it from unwanted disclosure. A rival firm invests to ferret out this knowledge. Trade secrets law affects this "secrecy contest" by...

This paper develops an original mean-variance model able to capture the disposition of the parties towards both standard risk and ambiguity. Ambiguity arises when the causal link between conduct and harm is not univocal, as is frequently the case with toxic torts. Risk aversion and ambiguity...

This paper investigates cases in which harms are statistically correlated. When parties are risk averse, correlation plays an important role in the choice between liability rules. Specifically, positively correlated harms favor a liability rule that spreads the risk over a multitude of parties,...

This chapter, forthcoming in the Research Handbook on Law and Time (F. Fagan & S. Levmore eds., Edward Elgar 2024), offers a contribution to the economics of legal transition. It argues that the lawmaker should mitigate the burden generated by the risk of legal change by avoiding "extreme"...