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In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281206
In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible effort in order to increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of the win probability in the literature is the so-called logit" contest success function. We provide a simple micro-foundation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266296
Empirical evidence suggests that banks often engage in refinancing of intrinsically insolvent debtors instead of writing of their non-performing loans. Such forbearance lending may induce soft budget constraints for the debtors, as it diminishes their incentives to thwart default. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301816
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804
This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264746
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274941
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014306483
No abstract available
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264282
In the economics profession there is a fierce debate whether industrial and innovation policy should be targeted to specific sectors or firms. This paper discusses the welfare effects of such targeted policies from the perspective of strategic game theory of the firm. A theoretical case for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325795