Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority's resource...

The paper develops a four-step framework to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In the first step, an estimate of the impact of the merger on the market price needs to be derived. Subsequent, the second step of the framework has to assess whether such a predicted price increase would be...

An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.

Die jüngsten, einem ?more economic approach? verpflichteten Reformen im europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht geben Anlaß, sich verstärkt mit der ökonomischen Effizienz als Leitbild der Wettbewerbspolitik zu befassen. In diesem Beitrag wird in Übereinstimmung mit der überwiegenden Praxis in der...

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports bythe U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of theconditional probabilities for...

Hardly any antitrust lawyer would deny that antitrust needs solid foundations in economics. Antitrust authorities hire economists, if they do not even haven the position of a chief economist. Antitrust not only capitalises on economic theory, but it is equally sensitive to empirical studies, be...

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which...

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in...

Mittels der Abschöpfung eines „Wirtschaftlichen Vorteils“ im Rahmen von Kartellstrafen sollen gleichermaßen im Sinne einer Bebußung negative Anreize für wettbewerbswidriges Handeln gesetzt und hierdurch aufgetretene Wettbewerbsvorteile ausgeglichen werden. Dabei ist die ökonomische...