Inherent to most research projects is the fact that researchers learn about their project during the course of it. Research investments result in signals on development costs. This paper studies how this fact influences firms’ investments, and how revenue sharing can correct inefficient...

We study the optimal regulation of complementary input supply. The regulator chooses for either a monopolist producing two complementary inputs in fixed proportion, or two independent firms producing one input each. Under independent input supply, nonmonotonic regulatory schemes become optimal...

We demonstrate that the correlation of saving and investment is measured best by an error correction model (ECM), because theory implies a cointegrating relation between these variables. The ECM comprises all previous specifications as special cases, which are shown to be potentially...

The Norwegian capital controls had a significant effect on stock returns only in the early eighties when controls were stringent although they did not influence short-term interest rates throughout the sample period (1980-90). Our result thus contributes to a growing body of evidence on the...

This paper investigates the relationship between bilateral FDI positions and cross-country business cycle correlations in the period 1982–2001. We find that countries that have comparatively intensive FDI relations also have more synchronized business cycles during 1995–2001. Before 1995, we...

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor´s...

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals' beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives...

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn...

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In...

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information...