Inherent to most research projects is the fact that researchers learn about their project during the course of it. Research investments result in signals on development costs. This paper studies how this fact influences firms’ investments, and how revenue sharing can correct inefficient...

We study the optimal regulation of complementary input supply. The regulator chooses for either a monopolist producing two complementary inputs in fixed proportion, or two independent firms producing one input each. Under independent input supply, nonmonotonic regulatory schemes become optimal...

We demonstrate that the correlation of saving and investment is measured best by an error correction model (ECM), because theory implies a cointegrating relation between these variables. The ECM comprises all previous specifications as special cases, which are shown to be potentially...

The Norwegian capital controls had a significant effect on stock returns only in the early eighties when controls were stringent although they did not influence short-term interest rates throughout the sample period (1980-90). Our result thus contributes to a growing body of evidence on the...

This paper investigates the relationship between bilateral FDI positions and cross-country business cycle correlations in the period 1982–2001. We find that countries that have comparatively intensive FDI relations also have more synchronized business cycles during 1995–2001. Before 1995, we...

This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a...

We study the incentives of Cournot oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common cost (or demand) parameter. Since information acquisition is such that firms may fail to acquire information, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. This paper...

Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals' beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms' disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under...

Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals’ beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on their cost of investment. The firms’ disclosure strategies affect their incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under voluntary disclosure with those under...

Firms learn imperfectly about their cost of investment. We study how this information affects firms’ incentives to invest in R&D by comparing investments and profits under public and private information. Revenue sharing between the winner and loser of the race, e.g. through licensing...