It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a...

Der Beitrag fokussiert auf das wertorientierte Management und die daran anknüpfenden Kompensationsprogramme für Manager. Unterstellt man dem Management ein den eigenen Nutzen maximierendes und möglicherweise opportunistisches Verhalten, so ist nicht auszuschliessen, dass das Management die...

As it is widely believed that the behaviour of large Japanese companies is different from that of their British counterparts, hypothesises that the directors in both countries may have different financial incentives. The research estimates the determinants of executive compensation, using the...

Society's demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the psychology and economics of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which...

Good corporate reputation is seen as one of the most valuable assets. It is believed to cause a multitude of favorable impacts within different stakeholder groups. As a consequence, a multitude of studies analyzed the relationship between corporate reputation and financial performance. However,...

The pressures to accommodate to the global standards of corporate governance (CG) for Japanese public companies had grown strong since the mid-1990s. A series of legal reforms has led to the formal imitation of the market oriented Anglo-American model which, however, was not accompanied by the...

Financial leverage increases the expected return on equity. We show that this leverage effect is not only irrelevant for shareholders' present wealth but also for the return on their investments. This result is straightforward if we do not only look at the return on equity but at the return on...