the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core … interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in … in many practical applications, such as NRMP (National Resident Matching Program). …

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the … core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence …

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …

the clan by a 'dualize and extend' procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …