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Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008
antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325912
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Weltölmärkte: Angebotsmacht der OPEC ungebrochen
von Hirschhausen, Christian; Holz, Franziska; Huppmann, … - In: DIW Wochenbericht 76 (2009) 23, pp. 370-375
Trotz des starken Rückgangs der Rohölpreise seit dem Herbst 2008 ist das Preisniveau mit gegenwärtig rund 60 US-Dollar pro Fass immer noch deutlich höher als im langfristigen Durchschnitt. Die Marktmacht der Organisation erdölexportierender Länder (OPEC) ist nach wie vor sehr groß und...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602007
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Cartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in German coal mining, 1881-1913
Burhop, Carsten; Lübbers, Thorsten - 2008
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany's main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264842
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Is cartelisation profitable? A case study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913
Lübbers, Thorsten - 2009
precisely, we consider the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, a coal cartel that operated in Imperial Germany in the late 19th … event study methodology to asses the reaction of the stock market to the foundation of the cartel and two major revisions of … data in a dynamic panel data framework. Overall, our results suggest that the investigated cartel had no significant effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266957
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A model for the global crude oil market using a multi-pool MCP approach
Huppmann, Daniel; Holz, Franziska - 2009
This paper proposes a partial equilibrium model to describe the global crude oil market. Pricing on the global crude oil market is strongly influenced by price indices such as WTI (USA) and Brent (Northwest Europe). Adapting an approach for pool-based electricity markets, the model captures the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271092
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Representing GASPEC with the World Gas Model
Egging, Ruud; Holz, Franziska; von Hirschhausen, … - 2008
withhold production. The results shows that compared to a Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274286
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Going Once, Going Twice, Reported!
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2009
modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel … deterrence, cartelstability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartelformation …, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces theaverage winning bid. In contrast, while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325640
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Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
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On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano - 2001
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608824
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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Françoise - 2010
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875