types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and …

the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …

exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal … may prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the … principal may optimally want to allow the agent to reduce his risk exposure. Nevertheless, even endogenous risk may be higher …

In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers … tournament framework that risk in terms of chance is beneficial from the point of view of a profit maximizing principal who …

compensation incentives are linked to risk-taking behaviors. Subsequently, the compensation structure of non-CEO executives is … empirically investigates to which extent CEO's incentives - specifically equity and risk-taking incentives - model the trade …