Daß ökonomische Prozesse zu den primären evolutorischen Untersuchungsgegenständen gehören und wie alle handlungserzeugten Prozesse, die nicht antizipierte Neuheiten hervorrufen können, grundsätzlich als verlaufs- und ergebnisoffen zu konzipieren sind, ist unstrittig. Um den Problemen des...

Can one define and test the hypothesis of (un)bounded rationality in stochastic choice tasks without endorsing Bayesianism? Similar to the state specificity of assets, we rely on state-specific goal formation. In a given choice task, the list of state-specific goal levels is optimal if one...

Social Darwinism suggests that in crisis situations leaders have to be replaced by better fitting leaders. An opposing school argues that leaders, based on their personality, are successful in all situations and therefore can master all situations including a crisis. A third view concludes that...

In diesem Beitrag wird die theoretische Basis und der Stand der empirischen Forschung des Kontingenzansatzes des Behavioral Accounting zur Gestaltung unternehmensinterner Abrechnungssysteme ausgewertet. Als wichtigstes Ergebnis bleibt festzuhalten, daß über die Auswahl bestimmter...

Political economy and economic sociology have developed in relative isolation from each other. While political economy focuses largely on macrophenomena, economic sociology focuses on the level of social interaction in the economy. The paper argues that economic sociology can provide a...

The phenomenon of physical R&D-manufacturing co-location is interesting, because researchers have made very different observations regarding its prevalence. In some populations co-location of the two functions seems to be the norm; in others, an exception. However, we still do not have an...

While both manufacturing and R&D location decisions have received considerable theoretical and empirical attention from economists and organization scientists, theories and evidence regarding the co-location of the two are scarce. The goal of this article is to lay the theoretical foundation for...

We study theoretically and experimentally a two-person partnership game whereby agents only see the uncertain outcome of their joint effort but not how much the other agent contributed to it. The model combines problems of free-riding present in public good production and in teams with imperfect...