This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank’s monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks’ ex ante...

This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank’s monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks’ ex ante...

This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of a bank's monetary reserves (a liquidity crisis) occurs endogenously. We show that discount window lending by the LLR is welfare-improving but reduces banks' ex-ante incentive to hold monetary...

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Es wird untersucht, wie ein System privater Versicherungen gegen das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit beschaffen sein sollte. Zu dem Zweck wird ein Trennsystem vorgeschlagen, das Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitgebern gleichermaßen Anreize zur Verminderung von Arbeitslosigkeit gibt. Für die Arbeitnehmer...

Despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints, the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed. This paper offers such an analysis. We study, in particular, the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a...

In the education literature, it is generally acknowledged that both credit and insurance for students are rationed. In order to provide a rationale for these observations, we present a model with perfectly competitive banks and risk averse students who have private information on their ability...

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If...

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...