When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …

assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent's risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various …

This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of …, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our …