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Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring

Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - 2004

monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager's compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261074

Die Auswirkungen der Unternehmenstransparenz auf den Erfolg börsenorientierter Kapitalgesellschaften in Deutschland - Eine Darstellung des aktuellen Forschungsstandes

Schmidt, Marko; Grigoleit, Jens; Nippa, Michael - 2009

Die Erhöhung der Informationstransparenz seitens der Unternehmensleitung gegenüber den Anteilseignern ist eine wesentliche Forderung der Corporate Governance. Deshalb kommt ihr auch bei der Gesetzgebung und der Festlegung von Best Practice-Regeln sowie hinsichtlich der Unternehmensbewertung...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305805

Corporate rent-seeking and the managerial soft-budget constraint: An incremental cash flow approach to some corporate governance issues

Apreda, Rodolfo - 2004

This paper seeks to expand on two topical strands in Government Finance and Political Science literature, rent-seeking and the soft-budget constraint, so as to bring forth a strong linkage with corporate governance environments. It will attempt to accomplish this task by setting up a distinctive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323267

Setting a Fox to Keep the Geese: Does the comply-or-explain principle work?

Andres, Christian; Theissen, Erik - 2008

The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that comply with the code requirement. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302533

Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea: evidence from new panel data

Kato, Takao; Kim, Woochan; Lee, Ju Ho - 2005

This paper provides the first rigorous econometric estimates on the pay-performance relations for executives of Korean firms with and without Chaebol affiliation. To do so, we have assembled for the first time panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267324

No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion

Grechenig, Kristoffel; Sekyra, Michael - 2010

We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270439

Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening, and multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - 2013

talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … distorts incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete …, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help restore balance in agents' incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293214

Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges

Kato, Takao; Long, Cheryl - 2005

This paper provides evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on executive compensation and ownership structure, we find for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267302

The social-psychological perspective on executive compensation: evidence from a two-tier board system

Schwering, Anja; Sommer, Friedrich; Uepping, Florian; … - In: Journal of Business Economics 92 (2021) 2, pp. 309-345

This paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501774

Pay me Right: Reference Values and Executive Compensation

Gregorič, Aleksandra; Polanec, Sašo; Slapničar, Sergeja - 2008

This paper studies the impact of external reference values on managerial compensation contracts. We consider the effect of adoption of non-binding pay nfirms on actal remuneration behavior using a unique country example. We find that introduction of pay nfirms changed the reference values for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010313305

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