We prove some core convergence theorems for finite economies without monotone preferences or free disposal of commodities. When these assumptions are relaxed, the relationship between the continuum and the large finite economies is lost. Extra conditions are needed, in general, to obtain...

We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition. Specifically, we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-person real-effort competition (Gill and...

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...

This paper investigates the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-person real-effort competition (Gill and Prowse, 2012). "Social" and "asocial" versions of the Gill and Prowse experiment are compared, where the latter treatment...

Using a laboratory experiment we examine how social comparisons affect behavior in a sequential search task. In a control treatment, subjects search in isolation while in two other treatments subjects get feedback on the search decisions and outcomes of a partner subject. The average level and...

We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what co-workers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in...

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus...

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...