In the widely used class of multidimensional poverty measures introduced by Alkire and Foster (2011), dimension-specific weights combined with a single cut-off parameter play a fundamental role in identifying who is multidimensionally poor. This paper revisits how these parameters are...

We establish the NP-completeness of the variant of the bilevel assignment problem, where the leader and the follower both have bottleneck objective functions and were the follower behaves according to the optimistic rule. This result settles a problem that has been left open by Klinz & Gassner...

As a result of its liberalization, the European gas market is organized as an entry-exit system in order to decouple the trading and transport of natural gas. Roughly summarized, the gas market organization consists of four subsequent stages. First, the transmission system operator (TSO) is...

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of...

Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013) established the testable revealed preference restrictions for stable aggregate matching with transferable (TU) and non-transferable utility (NTU) and for extremal stable matchings. In this paper, we rephrase their restrictions in terms of properties on a...

We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows...

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort...

This paper builds upon a view of economic system and individual economic organization as problem-solving arrangements and presents a simple model of adaptive problem-solving driven by trial-and-error and collective selection. The institutional structure, and in particular its degree of...

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under...