Showing 1 - 10 of 6,141
committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters …Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604339
voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266322
We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434945
This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the … sincere voting is an equilibrium outcome of our model for a large set of parameter values implying the possibility of ex post … conflict between committee members. Furthermore, abandonning the assumption of sincere voting, we characterize necessary and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312976
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522110
during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227616
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288420
of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private … committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also … those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325304
Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as … able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325475
We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331153