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The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice

Bergh, Andreas; Engseld, Peter - 2006

The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208482

Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis

Engseld, Peter; Bergh, Andreas - 2005

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents' propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208494

Do people care about context? Framing effects in dictator games

Dreber, Anna; Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; … - 2011

Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286337

Competing social identities and intergroup discrimination: Evidence from a framed field experiment with high school students in Vietnam

Chan, Ho Fai; Torgler, Benno - 2021

that group identity is a key factor in the explanation of intergroup cooperation and competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534379

Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition

Bade, Sophie - 2011

The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305970

Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - 2003

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325075

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Weibull, Jörgen W.; Saez-Marti, Maria - 1998

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334971

Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory

Fleurbaey, Marc; Roemer, John E. - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 289-310

Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599447

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599453

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - 2017

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816737

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