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Sleep Restriction and Time‐of‐Day Impacts on Simple Social Interaction
Dickinson, David L.; McElroy, Todd - 2016
classic simple bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, and trust games). Specifically, we experimentally manipulate sleep …Simple bargaining games are the foundation of more complex social interactions necessary for healthy relationships and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451251
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Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852710
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Patience and ultimatum in bargaining
Segendorff, Björn - 2002
This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand … the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s) receive his (their) demand(s) in the second period and the eventually … remaining player becomes residual claimant. If no ultimatums are made then there is a Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining. Relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281330
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Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle
Cigno, Alessandro - 2021
This paper reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular … effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense … that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657932
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Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle
Cigno, Alessandro - 2021
This paper reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular … effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense … that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012658200
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Rules, preferences and evolution from the family angle
Cigno, Alessandro - 2021
This paper reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular … the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense that … the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new traits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012590199
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The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life
Müller, Stephan - 2014
for the evolution of preferences. In singlegame environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality …This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420547
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A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia; … - 2014
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208684
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A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Montinari, Natalia; … - 2014
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder´s conflict payoff. Neither variation affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435144
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Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
Weibull, Jörgen W.; Saez-Marti, Maria - 1998
the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that 'cleverness' in this respect indeed does have an … bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334971