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leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307887
with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in embezzlement in that facing an honest Official A reduces … embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement … Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653949
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional … level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher … heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272395
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional … level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher … heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168349
and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and … corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when … generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320108
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352428
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011887366
financing increases with freedom from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and decreases with court disputes. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507053
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803
This paper analyzes the existing relationship between economic growth and the monitoring of corruption and examines the … possible outcome of the implementation of a State reform in order to weed out corruption. Growth is always higher when … monitoring is high and therefore corruption eradicated. But growth declines when monitoring against corruption is not too high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293997