exemption for so-called ministerial cartels under Section 8 GWB was discarded without replacement. Similar to the still existing … from the general ban on cartels under Section 1 GWB for "predominant reasons relating to the economy as a whole and the … the much-discussed instrument of ministerial approval under Section 42 GWB by a regulation on the exemption of cartels …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm …

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an … investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of … inffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase …

antitrust exemption, access rules to Judo tournaments, sale systems of media rights in European football as well as a unique …

model scenario with differently informed consumers that MCCs primarily serve as a device to facilitate collusion instead of …

constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little …

preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing …-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties …

Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust … forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be … for corruption. This paper assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti …

Antidumping creates opportunities for abuse to stifle market competition. Whether cartels actually abuse trade policy …

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments … less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a …