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Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in … stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472
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An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D. - 2021
common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation … between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that …, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605973
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Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets
Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, … - 2016
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. We give participants the option to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574204
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Self-Confidence and Unraveling In Matching Markets
Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, … - 2017
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. We give participants the option to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592125
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Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns
Huesmann, Katharina; Wambach, Achim - 2015
Various markets ban or heavily restrict monetary transfers. This is often motivated by moral concerns. However, it appears to be disputable whether the observed restrictions on transfers are the appropriate market design answer to these concerns. Instead of exogenously restricting transfers on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531829
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Matching markets with signals
Kushnir, Alexey - 2009
A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279631
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Aggregate behavior in matching markets with flexible contracts and non-transferable representations of preferences
Dagsvik, John K.; Jia, Zhiyang - 2018
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earlier in the literature. Agents in the matching market search for a match among potential partners, including agreements about a flexible contract, such as hours and wage combinations in the labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968645
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Experiments on matching markets: A survey
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019
the agents, on the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome, as well as on the distribution of utility. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012008250
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Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms
Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019
about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110583
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A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues
Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, Mehmet B. - 2005
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312324