that banks require collateral from observably riskier borrowers (lender selection effect), while lower risk premiums arise …

An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit …

paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some …

asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … distorts the operation of credit markets. We show that a binding CVaR constraint introduces credit rationing and lowers social …

Credit bureaus administering information sharing among lenders about customers reduce information asymmetry and should … be key to modern credit markets. In contrast to former studies, we show that willingness to share information depends … strategy if banks think long-term. If banks are myopic no information sharing may occur. …

I address the following issue in this paper: how does information sharing among banks about borrowers affect banks … sharing among banks reduces lenders' risk and results in lower lending rates than any other arrangement. This may be the … reason why regulators of the banking industry would like to see full information sharing in most countries. I shall show …

macroprudential policy is represented by a convex dependence of bank capital requirements on the quantity of uncollateralized credit …

lending in the sense that some socially productive firms are denied credit due to excessively high interest rate. …

inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship … and arm's-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We … show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower …