The distributions of income and wealth in countries across the world are found to possess some robust and stable features independent of the specific economic, social and political conditions of the countries. We discuss a few physics-inspired multi-agent dynamic models along with their...

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...

In this paper, I examine an inter-temporal exchange economy with a complete financial market. The economy is populated by two heterogeneous investors who differ from each other in their attitudes towards risk. In such a model, a single representative agent can be created who generates the same...

The present note shows that the concept of a distribution economy (Hildenbrand (1974)) is closely related to a framework of an exchange economy in which the agents’ individual characteristics (i.e. preferences and endowments) are random (Hildenbrand (1971), Bhattacharya and Majumdar (1973),...

This paper discusses the testable implications of the Walrasian hypotheses: H1 Observed market demand is the sum of consumer's demands derived from utility maximization subject to budget constraints. H2 There exists an observable (locally) unique equilibrium price system such that the observable...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

Coherent measures of risk defined by the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance are recent tools in risk management to assess the amount of risk agents are exposed to. If they also satisfy law invariance and comonotonic additivity, then we get a...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term —logit...

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in non-cooperative Bayesian games.