In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first … corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution … auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction …

. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a procurement mechanism that can be viewed as a …

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of …