In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first … corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using … kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types …. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in …

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or …

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional …