This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …

the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when … principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in … monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear …

Effective monitoring requires proper incentives and detection skill. Detection skills depend on the extent of … specialization in monitoring and on the number of agents to be supervised. This paper demonstrates that hierarchy and monitoring of … monitors can provide the necessary incentives for the monitoring agents, which induces them to make use of their detection …

workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases … quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. Committed workers also produce … results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to …

autonomy but also experience more control via stronger monitoring, while non-executive employees only experience more … monitoring without receiving more work autonomy. Our theoretical setting is based on a modified principal-agent model. In our …

autonomy but also experience more control via stronger monitoring, while non-executive employees only experience more … monitoring without receiving more work autonomy. Our theoretical setting is based on a modified principal-agent model. In our …

This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An …