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We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711
We introduce a new notion of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) called maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE), which is based on the maximin expected utility (MEU) formulation. In particular, agents maximize maximin expected utility conditioned on their own private information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282892
This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the new notions we introduce.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282910
The conflict between Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal (efficient) allocations are not incentive compatible is a fundamental fact in information economics, mechanism design and general equilibrium with asymmetric information. This important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282940