Voting power theories measure the ability of voters to influence the outcome of an election under a given voting rule. In general, each theory gives a different evaluation of power, raising the question of their appropriateness, and calling for the need to identify classes of rules for which...

Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...

In communities highly dependent on rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods, the common occurrence of climatic shocks can lower the marginal cost of a child and raise fertility. We test this hypothesis using longitudinal data from Madagascar. Exploiting exogenous within-district year-to-year...

A large literature documents persistent impacts of formal historical institutions. However, very little is known about how these institutions interact with ancestral traditions to determine long-term economic and social outcomes. This paper addresses this question by studying the persistent...

We address the problem of finding the optimal lockdown and reopening policy during a pandemic like COVID-19 for a social planner who prioritizes health over the economy. Agents are connected through a fuzzy network of contacts, and the planner's objective is to determine the policy that contains...

We study the effect of strategic and partisan voting on electoral outcomes, and on the relative popularity of the victor. Voters are randomly assigned to be partisan or strategic. When all voters are strategic in a plurality election, any equilibrium manipulation of the outcome elects a popular...

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash...

How do pandemics affect for-profit and not-for-profit organizations differently? To address this question, we analyze optimal lockdowns in a two-sector continuous-time individual-based mean-field epidemiological model. We uncover a unique solution that depends on network structure, lockdown...

This study develops an economic model for a social planner who prioritizes health over short- term wealth accumulation during a pandemic. Agents are connected through a weighted undirected network of contacts, and the planner's objective is to determine the policy that contains the spread of...

We study the long-run stability of trade networks in a two-sided economy of agents labelled men and women. Each agent desires relationships with the other type, but having multiple partners is costly. This cost-benefit trade-off results in each agent having a single-peaked utility over the...