It is well known that efficient estimation of average treatment effects can be obtained by the method of inverse propensity score weighting, using the estimated propensity score, even when the true one is known. When the true propensity score is unknown but parametric, it is conjectured from the...

This paper studies an alternative bias correction for the M-estimator, which is obtained by correcting the moment equations in the spirit of Firth (1993). In particular, this paper compares the stochastic expansions of the analytically-bias-corrected estimator and the alternative estimator and...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a...

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of...

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles and binary games of complete information. We provide conditions under which we can recover both the interaction effects and the distributions of potentially correlated unobservables across goods in...

When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...