In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under … preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the …

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …

military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and …

Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … structure and (cooperative) solution concepts. The main structural condition is an acyclicity notion that rules out the …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …