This supporting material for An Indicator for Ecosystem Externalities in Fishing provides the estimations of the cost model parameters, establishes a price model, performs sensitivity analyses of the cost model parameters and analyzes sensitivity with respect to the control variable.

Ecosystem externalities arise when one use of an ecosystem affects its other uses through the production functions of the ecosystem.We use simulations from a size-spectrum ecosystem model to investigate the ecosystem externality created by fishing of multiple species. The model is based upon...

In this article, we look at the combination of several market-based climate and energy policies and compare them with first best solution, i.e., a perfectly designed emission tax or emission cap level. It is shown that in the case an emission control policy is imperfect designed or implemented,...

We study optimal fishery management in an age-structured, bio-economic model where two age classes can be harvested independently. We show that the optimal amount of catch differs with age classes, and we derive conditions under which it is optimal to harvest only one age class. Our main policy...

This paper examines the social economic value of the Greenland off-shore shrimp fishery. The contribution of the fishery to the economy is examined using a cost-benefit analysis where the objective of the report is to examine the current state of the fishery rather than possible changes, which...

This paper deals with risk and uncertainties that are an inherent part of designing and implementing fisheries rebuilding plans. Such risk and uncertainties stem from a variety of sources, biological, economic and/or political factors, and are influenced by external factors like changing...

Many ocean fisheries are subject to a fundamental economic problem generally referred to as the common property problem. The common property problem manifests itself as excessive fishing fleets and fishing effort, depressed fish stocks and little or no profitability of the fishing activity,...

This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal...

The EU regulation of fisheries is decided in two levels. The level of the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important species is decided every year by the Council of Minsters. The TACs are allocated to the Member States as quotas. The Member States determine who is going to harvest the...

Within fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource...