We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

This paper provides an in-depth study of the (most) refined best reply correspondence introduced by Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2012). An example demonstrates that this correspondence can be very different from the standard best reply correspondence. In two-player games, however, the...

This work describes and discusses the implementation of AHP-Tutor, an Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) that provides training in various methods of derivation of priorities from an AHP comparison matrix. The purpose of our system is to offer exercise problems. The corresponding theoretical...

This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their co-workers, even if those skills are unethical. Specifically, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, one of the best baseball players in the last few decades, affected the performance of his teammates. In his...

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics...

Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policy makers make use markets, parties may attempt to manipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We experimentally find that policymakers could still benefit from following information...