We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians? incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians? pay and with polarization of policy preferences …. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave …

. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax …

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in … describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running … public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters want to control …

At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda … addressing an issue means that the status quo is maintained. Politicians differ in their ability to make correct decisions. They … that politicians and voters have different priors concerning the desirability of a major reform. We show that electoral …

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine …. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re …