Socially responsible investment in analyzed in a general equilibrium context. This is important in order to understand the ultimate consequences of SRI on the decisions of economic agents. Building on models by Brock (1982) and Merton (1987), SRI is modelled as the choice to voluntarily give up...

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved...

The option of adapting to climate change is becoming more important in climate change policy. Hence, responding to climate change now involves both mitigation to address the cause and adaptation as a response to already ongoing or expected changes. These changes are also of relevance for the...

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

A large market economy has a huge number of degrees of freedom with weak microlevel coordination. The 'implicit microfoundations' approach assumes this property of micro-level interactions more strongly conditions macro-level outcomes compared to the precise details of individual choice...

A large market economy has a huge number of degrees of freedom with weak microlevel coordination. The 'implicit microfoundations' approach considers this property of micro-level interactions to more strongly determine macro-level outcomes compared to the precise details of individual choice...

Son yıllarda iktisat yazınında disiplinler arası çalışmaların sayısı giderek artmaktadır. Bu ilginin altında, doğrusal ve statik modellere dayanan klasik iktisat teorisinin modellerinin, gerçekte kompleks/karmaşık özellik gösteren yapıları çözümlemede yetersiz kalması...

Equilibrium assumptions posit relations between different people's beliefs and behavior without describing a process that causes these relations to hold. I show that because equilibrium models do not describe a causal process whereby one endogenous variable affects another, attempts to decompose...

V tomto článku překládám nástin jednoho z možných přístupů, jakým může ekonomická teorie reagovat na aktuální výzvu, kterou představuje Easterlinův paradox. Klíčové téma vyžadující hlubší pochopení a uchopení ekonomickým aparátem je sociální povaha člověka,...

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.