Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process...

This paper discusses the political economy of the climate change debate. The objective is to come to a better understanding of why at international levels (e. g. the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm) climate change was one of the main topics at the agenda, despite the fact that climate change cannot...

This paper discusses aspects related to the green technology sector in Germany. In a ?rst step institutional reforms enabling diffusion of green technologies are analysed. Cost arguments are also taken into account. In a second step a theoretical model developed by Tanguay et al. (2004) is...

This study is about structural change in the energy system. In a first step an econometric model is presented and in a second step diffusion of GTs is embedded theoretically. By focusing on different green technology industries (GT sector) in Germany, we analyze how policy induced demand...

Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduction we rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reduction targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a final...